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| + | ====== Fake Electricity Disconnection Call Scam India (2026) ====== | ||
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| + | {{ : | ||
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| + | <WRAP center round info 95%> | ||
| + | **Quick Reply:** Criminals impersonate power-company staff threatening immediate disconnection unless you pay via UPI. Learn the BNS sections, consumer rules and complaint steps. | ||
| + | </ | ||
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| + | {{htmlmetatags> | ||
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| + | {{htmlmetatags> | ||
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| + | A common version of this scam goes like this: a consumer in a city gets a call from a number such as " | ||
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| + | > **Citizen Crisis Response Network** \\ Do not disconnect the call immediately — note caller ID, time, exact demand, app name, UPI handle and bank details; record the call if your State allows one-party consent; take a screenshot of the incoming-call screen; then hang up and verify arrears directly on your DISCOM' | ||
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| + | ===== Direct answer (featured snippet) ===== | ||
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| + | **1.** Scammers impersonate electricity-distribution company (DISCOM) officials, cite fake " | ||
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| + | ===== In this guide ===== | ||
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| + | * [[#How the fake electricity disconnection scam works|How the fake electricity disconnection scam works]] | ||
| + | * [[#Why these scams succeed—psychological triggers|Why these scams succeed—psychological triggers]] | ||
| + | * [[#Legal framework: BNS 2023, IT Act & Electricity Act 2003|Legal framework: BNS 2023, IT Act & Electricity Act 2003]] | ||
| + | * [[# | ||
| + | * [[#Filing an FIR and NCRP complaint|Filing an FIR and NCRP complaint]] | ||
| + | * [[#DISCOM complaint and consumer grievance redress|DISCOM complaint and consumer grievance redress]] | ||
| + | * [[# | ||
| + | * [[#Recovery options if money was transferred|Recovery options if money was transferred]] | ||
| + | * [[# | ||
| + | * [[#Myth vs reality table|Myth vs reality table]] | ||
| + | * [[#Internal links and tools|Internal links and tools]] | ||
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| + | ===== How the fake electricity disconnection scam works ===== | ||
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| + | The attacker begins with reconnaissance. Consumer Account Numbers (CAN) and names can leak through: | ||
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| + | - Publicly visible complaint tickets on DISCOM portals. | ||
| + | - Data-broker aggregators scraping electricity-bill PDFs shared on unencrypted forums. | ||
| + | - Insider complicity at meter-reading or billing agencies. | ||
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| + | Armed with your CAN, the caller often uses Voice-over-IP (VoIP) technology to spoof a number that looks like the DISCOM' | ||
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| + | **Phase one: Verification theatre.** "Good afternoon, am I speaking to Mr [name], consumer number 1234567890? Yes sir, we see your last payment was on 15 January. There is a pending balance of ₹8, | ||
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| + | **Phase two: Urgency injection.** "Sir, as per the disconnection order, if payment is not received within two hours, the field team will cut supply today itself. After disconnection, | ||
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| + | **Phase three: Payment redirection.** "To stop the order immediately, | ||
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| + | Once money transfers, the fraudster vanishes. DISCOM customer care, when contacted, confirms: "No such arrears. No disconnection order. Not our number." | ||
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| + | > **Warning** — A legitimate DISCOM will **never** accept payment on a personal UPI handle, through QR codes sent via WhatsApp, or demand reconnection fees upfront. Statutory procedure requires a written notice under the Electricity Act 2003 s.56(2) and the Electricity (Rights of Consumers) Rules 2020, delivered to the registered address, with at least 15 clear days before disconnection for non-payment. | ||
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| + | ===== Why these scams succeed—psychological triggers ===== | ||
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| + | Behavioural science explains why so many people comply at first contact: | ||
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| + | - **Authority bias:** Caller uses official-sounding terminology — " | ||
| + | - **Scarcity & deadline:** A two-hour window creates panic and bypasses rational verification. | ||
| + | - **Confirmation bias:** The caller' | ||
| + | - **Loss aversion:** Fear of losing essential service (electricity in summer, remote work, medical equipment) overrides financial caution. | ||
| + | - **Social proof manipulation: | ||
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| + | Typical victims span a wide age range and varied digital literacy; many run a small business or work from home and have a past-dues history (even if settled), which makes them more anxious about a " | ||
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| + | > **Most citizens miss this** — The caller will often correctly state your *last bill amount* but inflate a fake " | ||
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| + | ===== Legal framework: BNS 2023, IT Act & Electricity Act 2003 ===== | ||
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| + | **Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023:** | ||
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| + | * **Section 318(4) — Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.** Imprisonment up to 7 years + fine. Where the fraudster deceives the victim into parting with money, this is the core offence. | ||
| + | * **Section 319(2) — Cheating by personation.** The fraudster pretends to be a DISCOM employee (a real or imaginary person) to deceive the victim. Imprisonment up to 5 years, or fine, or both. | ||
| + | * **Section 316 — Criminal breach of trust.** If an insider DISCOM contractor dishonestly misuses or sells consumer databases entrusted to them. | ||
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| + | **Information Technology Act 2000 (as amended):** | ||
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| + | * **Section 66C — Identity theft.** Dishonestly using another person' | ||
| + | * **Section 66D — Cheating by personation using a computer resource.** Directly applicable to vishing/UPI fraud; punishment: up to 3 years + fine. | ||
| + | * **Section 43A — Compensation for failure to protect data.** Where a body corporate is negligent in maintaining reasonable security practices for sensitive personal data and that causes wrongful loss. | ||
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| + | **Electricity Act 2003:** | ||
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| + | * **Section 56(2) — Disconnection for non-payment.** Requires a written notice (not less than 15 clear days); a purely oral or telephonic " | ||
| + | * **Section 135 — Theft of electricity.** If the scammer falsely accuses the victim of illegally drawing power to coerce payment, the false accusation itself may give rise to other remedies; theft of electricity is dealt with under s.135 (s.126 deals with assessment for unauthorised use). | ||
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| + | **Consumer Protection Act 2019:** | ||
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| + | * **Section 2(47) — Unfair trade practice;** **Section 2(11) — deficiency in service.** If a DISCOM' | ||
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| + | For consumer grievance redressal in the electricity sector, every distribution licensee must run a Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum (CGRF) under Electricity Act 2003 s.42(5), with appeal to the State Electricity Ombudsman under s.42(6). Timelines are fixed by the relevant State Electricity Regulatory Commission' | ||
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| + | > **Do this immediately** — Screenshot your DISCOM app home screen showing the actual dues at the time of the call. This timestamped record helps your FIR and NCRP complaint, showing no legitimate disconnection threat existed. | ||
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| + | ===== Step-by-step immediate response checklist ===== | ||
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| + | **Within the call (if still ongoing):** | ||
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| + | - Ask: " | ||
| + | - Note the exact time, caller-ID digits, and name given. | ||
| + | - Do NOT share any OTP, bank CVV, UPI PIN, or download any remote-access app. | ||
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| + | **Immediately after hanging up:** | ||
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| + | 1. Open the official DISCOM mobile app or website (use the URL from a printed bill, not a Google search). | ||
| + | 2. Log in and verify " | ||
| + | 3. Take a full-screen screenshot with date/time visible. | ||
| + | 4. Check your SMS inbox for any prior written notice. | ||
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| + | **If you already transferred money:** | ||
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| + | - Note the exact UPI transaction ID, beneficiary VPA (e.g., scammer@paytm) and timestamp. | ||
| + | - Call your bank's 24×7 fraud helpline and request an immediate freeze on the beneficiary account. | ||
| + | - Report to NCRP / call 1930 as soon as possible — reporting quickly improves the chance of a successful freeze. | ||
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| + | **As soon as possible:** | ||
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| + | - File a cyber-crime FIR at the nearest police station or online via your State Cyber Cell portal. | ||
| + | - Raise a ticket on https:// | ||
| + | - Lodge a formal complaint on your DISCOM' | ||
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| + | > **Citizen tip** — If your local police station resists registering an FIR (claiming " | ||
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| + | ===== Filing an FIR and NCRP complaint ===== | ||
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| + | **FIR drafting essentials** (reference the cognizable offences): | ||
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| + | < | ||
| + | To, | ||
| + | The Station House Officer, | ||
| + | [Police Station Name], | ||
| + | [City, State PIN] | ||
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| + | Subject: FIR under BNS 2023 Sections 318(4), 319(2) & IT Act 2000 Sections 66C, 66D – Impersonation & Cheating via Fake Electricity Disconnection Call | ||
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| + | Respected Sir/Madam, | ||
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| + | I, [Your Full Name], son/ | ||
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| + | Date & Time of Incident: [DD/ | ||
| + | Caller ID: [+91-XXXXXXXXXX / Spoofed Number Display] | ||
| + | Amount Defrauded (if paid): ₹[Amount] | ||
| + | UPI Transaction ID (if applicable): | ||
| + | Beneficiary VPA: [scammer@bank] | ||
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| + | Sequence of Events: | ||
| + | 1. I received a call from the above number, caller identified himself as "[Name Given]," | ||
| + | 2. Caller stated outstanding arrears of ₹[Amount] and threatened disconnection within [X] hours unless payment was made immediately via UPI. | ||
| + | 3. Caller knew my CAN and last bill date, inducing belief of legitimacy. | ||
| + | 4. Under pressure, I transferred ₹[Amount] to UPI ID [scammer@bank] at [timestamp]. | ||
| + | 5. Upon verification through the official DISCOM app (screenshot attached as Exhibit A), no such arrears exist. DISCOM customer care confirmed no disconnection order. | ||
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| + | I request registration of FIR under: | ||
| + | - BNS 2023 Section 318(4): Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property | ||
| + | - BNS 2023 Section 319(2): Cheating by personation | ||
| + | - IT Act 2000 Section 66C: Identity theft | ||
| + | - IT Act 2000 Section 66D: Cheating by personation using a computer resource | ||
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| + | I also request: | ||
| + | - Freezing of the beneficiary bank account linked to UPI [scammer@bank]. | ||
| + | - Digital forensics of the caller number and VoIP trace. | ||
| + | - A DISCOM internal inquiry into any potential data breach. | ||
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| + | Attached Documents: | ||
| + | - Exhibit A: DISCOM app screenshot (dues at time of call) | ||
| + | - Exhibit B: Bank statement / UPI transaction receipt | ||
| + | - Exhibit C: Call log screenshot | ||
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| + | I am willing to cooperate fully in the investigation and appear as required. | ||
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| + | Date: [DD/ | ||
| + | Place: [City] | ||
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| + | [Signature] | ||
| + | [Your Name] | ||
| + | [Contact Number] | ||
| + | [Email ID] | ||
| + | </ | ||
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| + | **National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (NCRP) parallel complaint: | ||
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| + | Visit https:// | ||
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| + | NCRP complaints are handled under the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), Ministry of Home Affairs, which coordinates with banks for account-freeze requests. Reporting within the first few hours of the fraud materially improves the chance of stopping the money. | ||
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| + | ===== DISCOM complaint and consumer grievance redress ===== | ||
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| + | **Step 1: DISCOM internal grievance cell** | ||
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| + | Every DISCOM operates a grievance mechanism. File a complaint online via the DISCOM consumer portal or by email to its grievance/ | ||
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| + | **Step 2: Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum (CGRF) and Electricity Ombudsman** | ||
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| + | If the DISCOM does not respond within the prescribed timeline, approach the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum (CGRF) constituted under Electricity Act 2003 s.42(5), with a further appeal to the State Electricity Ombudsman under s.42(6). The applicable State commission' | ||
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| + | Sample prayer: | ||
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| + | < | ||
| + | Prayer for Relief: | ||
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| + | 1. Direct [DISCOM Name] to conduct an internal audit of consumer data security and submit a compliance report. | ||
| + | 2. Issue a public advisory on the fake disconnection call scam via SMS/email to consumers. | ||
| + | 3. Award compensation for mental agony and deficiency in service (inadequate data protection). | ||
| + | 4. Direct the DISCOM to strengthen verification for phone-based consumer interactions. | ||
| + | </ | ||
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| + | The Central Electricity Authority (CEA), a statutory body under the Ministry of Power (https:// | ||
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| + | > **Warning** — Do not accept an informal " | ||
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| + | ===== Prevention: How to verify legitimate DISCOM communication ===== | ||
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| + | **Red flags (never trust the call if these appear):** | ||
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| + | - Caller asks for an OTP, CVV, net-banking password, or UPI PIN. | ||
| + | - Payment demanded via a personal UPI handle (e.g., name@paytm, number@oksbi) instead of an official bill-desk link. | ||
| + | - A QR code sent via WhatsApp. | ||
| + | - Pressure: "Pay now or lose electricity forever," | ||
| + | - A request to download AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or QuickSupport. | ||
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| + | **Green flags (genuine DISCOM process):** | ||
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| + | - A written notice delivered to the registered address before disconnection (Electricity Act 2003 s.56(2)). | ||
| + | - SMS from a registered 6-digit sender ID (e.g., " | ||
| + | - Payment options that always include official channels: the DISCOM website, an official biller on a UPI app (search by official DISCOM name), or your bank's BBPS (Bharat Bill Payment System). | ||
| + | - Customer-care callbacks only to the registered mobile number on record. | ||
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| + | **Verification protocol (30-second check):** | ||
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| + | 1. Note the caller' | ||
| + | 2. Open the DISCOM official app (installed earlier from the Play Store / App Store, not via a link in the call). | ||
| + | 3. Log in → view " | ||
| + | 4. If it shows zero or a different amount, hang up and report. | ||
| + | 5. If unsure, call the DISCOM' | ||
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| + | **Pro tip:** Register for your DISCOM' | ||
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| + | ===== Recovery options if money was transferred ===== | ||
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| + | **Immediate (first few hours):** | ||
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| + | - **Bank fraud desk:** Call your bank's 24×7 fraud helpline and ask for a freeze/ | ||
| + | - **NCRP / 1930:** The portal and helpline can route a freeze request to the beneficiary bank. | ||
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| + | **Short-term (first days):** | ||
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| + | - **Police + bank coordination: | ||
| + | - **UPI app report:** Some UPI apps allow you to report a suspicious transaction/ | ||
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| + | **Medium-term: | ||
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| + | - **District Consumer Commission (CPA 2019 Section 35):** A complaint may be filed against the bank for deficiency in service. Filing fees and timelines depend on the claim value and forum. | ||
| + | - **RBI Ombudsman: | ||
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| + | **Long-term (civil recovery): | ||
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| + | - If the fraudster is identified, a civil suit for recovery and damages may be filed, attaching the criminal case status. A civil decree helps with asset attachment. | ||
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| + | **Compensation from the DISCOM (where a data leak is established): | ||
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| + | If an inquiry shows the data leaked from the DISCOM' | ||
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| + | > **Do this immediately** — Preserve all evidence in more than one place: (1) phone screenshot/ | ||
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| + | ===== Frequently asked questions ===== | ||
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| + | ==== Can I be held liable if I shared my CAN or bill details on a public forum? ==== | ||
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| + | No. Sharing your CAN for genuine purposes (e.g., a DISCOM complaint portal, a social-media grievance) does not make you liable for a subsequent fraud. However, if you shared an OTP or UPI PIN, the bank may partly deny a reversal citing contributory negligence. Liability for the fraud rests on the fraudster. | ||
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| + | ==== What if the caller ID shows my DISCOM' | ||
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| + | VoIP spoofing lets fraudsters mimic almost any number. A displayed caller ID is not authentication. Always verify by calling back the DISCOM' | ||
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| + | ==== My DISCOM says they " | ||
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| + | Consumer data should be shared only on a lawful basis and with appropriate safeguards. If you suspect misuse, file a complaint with the DISCOM' | ||
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| + | ==== Can I record the fraudster' | ||
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| + | Recording your own conversation is generally treated as permissible, | ||
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| + | ==== I paid ₹2,000. Is it worth filing an FIR and a consumer case for such a small amount? ==== | ||
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| + | Yes. Small frauds aggregate into large rackets, and your FIR helps the police establish a pattern. Consumer-forum filing fees are modest, and reporting deters future scams and adds to the public record even when the individual loss is small. | ||
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| + | ==== What happens if the fraudster' | ||
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| + | The police will investigate the mule holder. If the mule proves he was himself deceived (e.g., offered a " | ||
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| + | ==== DISCOM customer care told me "we have no control over scammers." | ||
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| + | Possibly — if a data breach or negligent security enabled the scam. Under CPA 2019, " | ||
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| + | ==== Can I get the fraudster' | ||
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| + | Yes. Report it to the Department of Telecommunications via the Sanchar Saathi portal (https:// | ||
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| + | ===== Myth vs reality table ===== | ||
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| + | ^ Myth ^ Reality ^ | ||
| + | | DISCOM employees call to collect payment immediately. | **False.** DISCOMs do not cold-call demanding instant UPI payment. Billing is via SMS/ | ||
| + | | If the caller knows my consumer number, the call is genuine. | **False.** Consumer numbers leak via public complaint portals, data brokers and insider breaches. Scammers use this data to build trust. | | ||
| + | | Paying via UPI to the DISCOM' | ||
| + | | Once I've paid, I cannot get the money back. | **Partially false.** Report quickly (NCRP / 1930 + your bank). The sooner you report, the better the chance of a freeze; civil and consumer routes also remain open. | | ||
| + | | Police won't register an FIR for a " | ||
| + | | I can file an FIR online and skip the police-station visit. | **Partially true.** Many States allow an e-FIR via cyber-cell portals, but complex cases may need an in-person statement. Check your State' | ||
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| + | ===== Internal links and tools ===== | ||
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| + | **RTI Wiki essential resources: | ||
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| + | * **RTI Assistant (drafter)** — Auto-generate an RTI application to a DISCOM asking, for example: "Copy of consumer data access logs for CAN [X] for period [dates]; details of third-party data-sharing agreements; data-breach incident reports." | ||
| + | * **PIO Reply Checker** — Upload the DISCOM' | ||
| + | * **Citizen Crisis Response Network** — Hub for scam alerts, FIR templates and statutory timelines. https:// | ||
| + | * **RTI Act 2005 Complete Guide** — Full text, section-wise commentary, exemptions and appeals. https:// | ||
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| + | **Government portals:** | ||
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| + | * National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal: https:// | ||
| + | * Sanchar Saathi (telecom fraud): https:// | ||
| + | * CERT-In: https:// | ||
| + | * Central Electricity Authority: https:// | ||
| + | * RBI Ombudsman (Complaint Management System): https:// | ||
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| + | {{tag> | ||