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case-studies:electoral-bonds-rti [2026/07/18 05:55] (current) – created - external edit 127.0.0.1
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 +{{htmlmetatags>metatag-keywords=(electoral bonds rti, electoral bonds transparency, rti election commission, rti SBI electoral bonds, political funding rti india)&metatag-description=(How RTI applications to the SBI, Election Commission, and Finance Ministry by activists and S Y Quraishi helped build the public record that fed the Supreme Court's 2024 Electoral Bonds ruling.)}}
  
 +====== How RTIs exposed the Electoral Bonds opacity — citizen guide 2026 ======
 +
 +{{ :social:auto:electoral-bonds-rti.png?direct&1200 |Electoral Bonds RTI case study — RTI Wiki}}
 +
 +<WRAP center round info 95%>
 +**Direct answer.** For years before the Supreme Court struck down the Electoral Bonds scheme in February 2024, RTI applicants — including former Chief Election Commissioner S Y Quraishi — sought donor and recipient data from the SBI and Election Commission. The authorities either withheld information or claimed they did not hold it. The RTI denials themselves became part of the public record that fed the landmark judgment.
 +</WRAP>
 +
 +The Electoral Bonds scheme, introduced in 2018, allowed companies and individuals to buy bonds from the State Bank of India and donate them to political parties — anonymously, from the perspective of the public. The donor's identity was known only to the SBI. No public disclosure was required. This created a structural opacity over India's political financing that several RTI applicants set out to pierce — years before the courts acted.
 +
 +===== Who filed =====
 +
 +Multiple RTI applications were filed over 2018–2023 to the SBI, the Election Commission of India (ECI), and the Finance Ministry. Among those publicly documented:
 +
 +  * **S Y Quraishi**, former Chief Election Commissioner of India, sought information from the ECI about the number, value, and recipient breakdown of Electoral Bonds.
 +  * **Commodore Lokesh Batra** (retd.), a prolific RTI applicant with a record on defence procurement, filed multiple applications to the Finance Ministry and PMO about the scheme's design and the SBI's role.
 +  * Several activists and journalists associated with the **[[cases/union-of-india-v-association-for-democratic-reforms-2002-sc|Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR)]]** and the **Common Cause** organisation filed RTI applications as part of their broader litigation strategy.
 +
 +===== What they asked =====
 +
 +The RTI questions, as filed and reported, included:
 +
 +  - How many Electoral Bonds have been purchased from the SBI, in what denominations, and in what total value, since the scheme's inception in January 2018?
 +  - What is the denomination-wise and party-wise breakdown of bonds encashed by registered political parties?
 +  - What due diligence, if any, does the SBI conduct on the identity of bond purchasers before issuing bonds?
 +  - Copies of any inter-ministerial notes or Finance Ministry file notings related to the design of the scheme, including any objections raised by the RBI or ECI.
 +
 +===== What the authorities replied =====
 +
 +The responses were a masterclass in RTI refusal:
 +
 +  * The **SBI** declined to provide bond-wise or purchaser-wise data, citing Section 8(1)(e) (information held in fiduciary capacity) and Section 8(1)(j) (personal privacy of purchasers). It argued that disclosing donor identities would violate confidentiality that was central to the scheme's design.
 +  * The **Election Commission** disclosed the aggregate amount of bonds encashed by parties in its annual reports — which it was required to do — but did not hold the per-bond donor data (that resided with the SBI). Some ECI responses noted that the Commission itself had previously opposed the scheme's anonymity provisions in internal communications to the government.
 +  * The **Finance Ministry** withheld the file notings about scheme design, citing §8(1)(a) (national security / sovereignty) and the broader public interest exemption — an application of §8 that RTI practitioners argued was a stretch.
 +
 +The **[[/cases/cic-rti-electoral-funding-2023|CIC]]** partially upheld some complaints, directing limited disclosure in a few cases, but the core transparency question remained unresolved through the RTI route alone.
 +
 +===== What journalism and litigation followed =====
 +
 +**Journalism:** The Wire, The Hindu, and Scroll published detailed investigations in 2019–2023 using the partial RTI data available, cross-referenced with ECI returns, to construct partial pictures of which parties received the most bonds. These stories maintained public pressure on the scheme.
 +
 +**Litigation:** ADR and Common Cause filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Supreme Court challenging the Electoral Bonds scheme's constitutionality. The RTI denials and the scheme's structural opacity formed part of the PIL's factual foundation — establishing that no RTI route remained open for citizens to know who was funding which party.
 +
 +**Supreme Court judgment (February 2024):** A Constitution Bench struck down the Electoral Bonds scheme in //[[cases/adr-v-uoi-electoral-bonds-2024|Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India]]// (2024), holding that it violated voters' right to information under Article 19(1)(a). The Court directed the SBI to disclose all bond purchase and redemption data to the ECI, which published the full dataset in March 2024.
 +
 +The RTI-produced record — years of applications, refusals, and partial disclosures — was part of the contextual foundation that the PIL built on.
 +
 +===== Why this matters for citizens =====
 +
 +**What this case proves you can do:**
 +
 +  - **Document institutional opacity.** Even RTI refusals are evidence. A systematic pattern of refusals over five years became part of the public record showing that no transparency mechanism existed.
 +  - **Feed litigation.** RTI data and RTI refusal orders can be appended to PILs and court petitions as documentary evidence of the problem.
 +  - **File to a former CEC.** The most effective RTI applicants in this cluster included a former Election Commissioner — demonstrating that [[/blog/rti-by-state-india-2026|RTI is a citizen tool]] used by people at all levels, including those who understand the system from inside.
 +
 +**If you want to follow up:** The full Electoral Bonds data disclosed by the ECI in March 2024 is publicly available at [[https://eci.gov.in|eci.gov.in]]. You can file RTIs to the SBI or ECI for more granular data than what was disclosed.
 +
 +===== Outbound citations =====
 +
 +  * Supreme Court judgment — //Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India// (2024) — [[https://main.sci.gov.in|main.sci.gov.in]]
 +  * Association for Democratic Reforms Electoral Bonds tracker — [[https://adrindia.org|adrindia.org]]
 +  * The Wire investigation on Electoral Bonds (2019 onwards) — [[https://thewire.in|thewire.in/politics/electoral-bonds]]
 +  * The Hindu on ECI opposition to Electoral Bonds — [[https://thehindu.com|thehindu.com]]
 +  * Scroll analysis of bond data post-disclosure — [[https://scroll.in|scroll.in]]
 +
 +===== FAQ =====
 +
 +==== Can I now file an RTI to get Electoral Bond data? ====
 +The Supreme Court's 2024 ruling required the SBI to disclose all bond data to the ECI, which published it. The dataset is publicly available at eci.gov.in. You can file an RTI for any additional data not in the published set — for example, state-wise or quarter-wise breakdowns — though the SBI may still cite statutory exemptions.
 +
 +==== Did the RTI route actually work for Electoral Bonds? ====
 +Not directly. The RTI route was systematically blocked by the SBI and Finance Ministry. What worked was the PIL route, which used the documented RTI failures as evidence of the opacity problem. This is a case where RTI's greatest contribution was demonstrating what it could not reach.
 +
 +==== Are Electoral Bonds still in operation? ====
 +No. The Supreme Court struck down the scheme in February 2024. No new bonds can be issued. The SBI disclosed all historical bond data to the ECI in March 2024 as directed by the Court.
 +
 +===== Related =====
 +
 +  * [[https://righttoinformation.wiki/case-studies/start|Famous RTIs that changed India — index]]
 +  * [[https://righttoinformation.wiki/case-studies/pm-cares-not-government-rti|PM CARES is not "Government" — what RTIs revealed]]
 +  * [[https://righttoinformation.wiki/rti-act-section-8|RTI Act Section 8 — exemptions explained]]
 +  * [[https://righttoinformation.wiki/free-rti/when-hiring-a-lawyer-is-worth-it|When hiring a lawyer for RTI is worth it]]
 +  * [[https://righttoinformation.wiki/tools/ai-rti-draft-app.html|AI RTI Drafter — file your own RTI now]]
 +===== Electoral bonds and RTI: How the Supreme Court struck down electoral bonds =====
 +
 +Electoral bonds and RTI — complete case study on how the Supreme Court struck down the electoral bond scheme:
 +
 +  - **Step 1: What were electoral bonds?** (a) electoral bonds were financial instruments — introduced by the Government of India — through the Finance Act, 2017 — as a mode of donation to political parties — by individuals and companies, (b) the bonds were issued by the State Bank of India (SBI) — in specified denominations (Rs 1,000, Rs 10,000, Rs 1 lakh, Rs 10 lakh, Rs 1 crore) — and were available for purchase — during specified periods — at SBI branches, (c) the donor purchased the bond (with KYC — the donor's name was recorded by the SBI — but the name was NOT disclosed to the political party — or to the public — or to the Election Commission), (d) the political party redeemed the bond (through a designated bank account — within 15 days — and the amount was credited to the party's account), (e) the key features: (i) anonymity (the donor's name was not disclosed — to the public — or to the political party), (ii) tax benefit (the donation was tax-deductible — under Section 80GGC of the Income Tax Act), (iii) no limit (there was no limit on the amount — that a company or individual could donate), (iv) only to registered parties (the bonds could be donated — only to political parties — registered under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act — and that secured at least 1% of the votes in the last election).
 +  - **Step 2: The RTI challenge.** (a) the electoral bonds were challenged — through RTI — by activists and civil society organizations — who filed RTI applications — asking for: (i) the total bonds sold (and the amount — and the donors), (ii) the total bonds redeemed (by each political party — and the amount), (iii) the donor details (the names of the donors — and the amounts — and the parties they donated to), (b) the government and the SBI refused — to provide the information — under Section 8(1)(d) (commercial confidence) — and Section 8(1)(j) (personal information) — and the CIC ordered disclosure — in several cases — but the government and the SBI did not comply, (c) the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) — and Common Cause — filed a writ petition — in the Supreme Court — challenging the electoral bond scheme — on grounds of: (i) opacity (the anonymity violated the voter's right to know — and the right to information — under Article 19(1)(a)), (ii) corruption (the anonymity facilitated corruption — and quid pro quo — between the donors and the political parties), (iii) violation of company law (the amendment to the Companies Act — that removed the cap on corporate donations — and the requirement of disclosure — was unconstitutional).
 +  - **Step 3: The Supreme Court judgment.** (a) on February 15, 2024 — the Supreme Court (a 5-judge bench — led by the Chief Justice of India) struck down the electoral bond scheme — as unconstitutional — in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, (b) the court held: (i) the electoral bonds violated the right to information (under Article 19(1)(a) — the voter has the right to know the source of political funding — and the anonymity of the bonds — violated this right), (ii) the scheme was not proportional (the restriction on the right to information — was not proportional — to the stated objective — of encouraging clean donations — because there were less restrictive alternatives — like electoral trusts — and digital donations — with disclosure), (iii) the amendment to the Companies Act (that removed the cap on corporate donations — and the requirement of disclosure — was unconstitutional — because it allowed unlimited and anonymous corporate donations — which could lead to quid pro quo — and corruption), (iv) the amendment to the Income Tax Act (that provided tax benefit — without disclosure — was also unconstitutional), (c) the court directed: (i) the SBI to disclose the details (of the bonds sold — and redeemed — including the donor names — and the amounts — and the parties — and the dates), (ii) the Election Commission to publish the details (on its website — by March 31, 2024), (iii) the political parties to refund the amounts (to the donors — for the bonds that were not redeemed — within the 15-day window).
 +  - **Step 4: The SBI disclosure.** (a) the SBI initially sought an extension (citing the complexity of the records — and the need for time — to compile the data — which the court rejected — and directed the SBI to disclose — by March 12, 2024), (b) the SBI disclosed the data (on March 12, 2024 — to the Election Commission — which published the data — on its website), (c) the data revealed: (i) the total bonds sold (Rs 16,518 crore — from April 2019 to February 2024), (ii) the total bonds redeemed (Rs 16,518 crore — by political parties), (iii) the top donors (Future Gaming, Megha Engineering, Vedanta, Apollo, Bharti Airtel — and others — with donations ranging from Rs 200 crore to Rs 1,300 crore), (iv) the top recipients (the BJP — Rs 8,200 crore — the Congress — Rs 1,900 crore — the TMC — Rs 1,600 crore — and others), (d) the data also revealed: (i) companies under investigation (donated to the ruling party — and the investigation was delayed — or dropped — raising concerns of quid pro quo), (ii) donors who donated to multiple parties (which suggested a strategy — to influence multiple parties — and to hedge political risk).
 +  - **Step 5: File RTI on electoral bonds.** File RTI with: (a) the State Bank of India (which is a [[/guide/public-authority/annual-rti-return|public authority]] — under the RTI Act — as a public sector bank) asking for: (i) the total bonds sold (and the amount — and the denominations — from [date] to [date]), (ii) the donor details (the names of the donors — and the amounts — and the parties — and the dates — as directed by the Supreme Court), (iii) the redeemed bonds (the parties — and the amounts — and the dates — and the bank accounts), (b) the Election Commission of India asking for: (i) the published data (the total bonds — and the donors — and the parties — and the amounts — as published on the website), (ii) the compliance status (whether the political parties have refunded the amounts — for the unredeemed bonds — and the status), (c) the Ministry of Finance asking for: (i) the electoral bond scheme (the notification — and the rules — and the amendments — and the legal framework), (ii) the review (whether the government has reviewed the scheme — after the Supreme Court's judgment — and the proposed alternatives).
 +  - **Step 6: Impact of the judgment.** (a) the judgment strengthened the right to information (by holding that political funding — is a matter of public interest — and the voter's right to know — extends to the source of political funding), (b) the judgment highlighted the role of RTI (the electoral bond data was obtained — through RTI — and through litigation — which exposed the opacity — and the corruption — in political funding), (c) the judgment set a precedent (for challenging government schemes — that violate transparency — and the right to information — under Article 19(1)(a)), (d) the judgment led to demands (for electoral reforms — including: (i) state funding of elections, (ii) capping corporate donations, (iii) mandatory disclosure of all donations — above a threshold, (iv) audit of political parties — by the CAG).
 +  - **Step 7: Practical tips.** (a) check the ECI website (for the electoral bond data — and the donor details — and the party details — before filing RTI), (b) file RTI with the SBI (for the bond sale and redemption details — and the donor details — if not available on the ECI website), (c) file RTI with the Ministry of Finance (for the scheme details — and the post-judgment review — and the proposed alternatives), (d) use the data for analysis (the electoral bond data is a rich source — for research — and for journalism — and for advocacy — on political funding — and on corruption), (e) Example: A journalist filed RTI with the SBI — asking for the electoral bond data — after the Supreme Court's judgment — the SBI provided the data — which showed that a company under CBI investigation — had donated Rs 100 crore — to the ruling party — during the investigation — the journalist published the story — which led to public outrage — and demands for an inquiry — into the quid pro quo — and the government's response — and the SBI's compliance with the court's order.
 +
 +See [[https://righttoinformation.wiki/case-studies/electoral-bonds-rti|Electoral Bonds RTI]] and [[https://righttoinformation.wiki/rti-act-2005-complete-guide|RTI Act Complete Guide]].
 +
 +{{tag>electoral bonds rti supreme court judgment association for democratic reforms sbi disclosure political funding anonymity corruption article 19 1 a 2026}}