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| + | ====== How RTIs exposed the Electoral Bonds opacity — citizen guide 2026 ====== | ||
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| + | <WRAP center round info 95%> | ||
| + | **Direct answer.** For years before the Supreme Court struck down the Electoral Bonds scheme in February 2024, RTI applicants — including former Chief Election Commissioner S Y Quraishi — sought donor and recipient data from the SBI and Election Commission. The authorities either withheld information or claimed they did not hold it. The RTI denials themselves became part of the public record that fed the landmark judgment. | ||
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| + | The Electoral Bonds scheme, introduced in 2018, allowed companies and individuals to buy bonds from the State Bank of India and donate them to political parties — anonymously, | ||
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| + | ===== Who filed ===== | ||
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| + | Multiple RTI applications were filed over 2018–2023 to the SBI, the Election Commission of India (ECI), and the Finance Ministry. Among those publicly documented: | ||
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| + | * **S Y Quraishi**, former Chief Election Commissioner of India, sought information from the ECI about the number, value, and recipient breakdown of Electoral Bonds. | ||
| + | * **Commodore Lokesh Batra** (retd.), a prolific RTI applicant with a record on defence procurement, | ||
| + | * Several activists and journalists associated with the **[[cases/ | ||
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| + | ===== What they asked ===== | ||
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| + | The RTI questions, as filed and reported, included: | ||
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| + | - How many Electoral Bonds have been purchased from the SBI, in what denominations, | ||
| + | - What is the denomination-wise and party-wise breakdown of bonds encashed by registered political parties? | ||
| + | - What due diligence, if any, does the SBI conduct on the identity of bond purchasers before issuing bonds? | ||
| + | - Copies of any inter-ministerial notes or Finance Ministry file notings related to the design of the scheme, including any objections raised by the RBI or ECI. | ||
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| + | ===== What the authorities replied ===== | ||
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| + | The responses were a masterclass in RTI refusal: | ||
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| + | * The **SBI** declined to provide bond-wise or purchaser-wise data, citing Section 8(1)(e) (information held in fiduciary capacity) and Section 8(1)(j) (personal privacy of purchasers). It argued that disclosing donor identities would violate confidentiality that was central to the scheme' | ||
| + | * The **Election Commission** disclosed the aggregate amount of bonds encashed by parties in its annual reports — which it was required to do — but did not hold the per-bond donor data (that resided with the SBI). Some ECI responses noted that the Commission itself had previously opposed the scheme' | ||
| + | * The **Finance Ministry** withheld the file notings about scheme design, citing §8(1)(a) (national security / sovereignty) and the broader public interest exemption — an application of §8 that RTI practitioners argued was a stretch. | ||
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| + | The **[[/ | ||
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| + | ===== What journalism and litigation followed ===== | ||
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| + | **Journalism: | ||
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| + | **Litigation: | ||
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| + | **Supreme Court judgment (February 2024):** A Constitution Bench struck down the Electoral Bonds scheme in // | ||
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| + | The RTI-produced record — years of applications, | ||
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| + | ===== Why this matters for citizens ===== | ||
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| + | **What this case proves you can do:** | ||
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| + | - **Document institutional opacity.** Even RTI refusals are evidence. A systematic pattern of refusals over five years became part of the public record showing that no transparency mechanism existed. | ||
| + | - **Feed litigation.** RTI data and RTI refusal orders can be appended to PILs and court petitions as documentary evidence of the problem. | ||
| + | - **File to a former CEC.** The most effective RTI applicants in this cluster included a former Election Commissioner — demonstrating that [[/ | ||
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| + | **If you want to follow up:** The full Electoral Bonds data disclosed by the ECI in March 2024 is publicly available at [[https:// | ||
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| + | ===== Outbound citations ===== | ||
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| + | * Supreme Court judgment — // | ||
| + | * Association for Democratic Reforms Electoral Bonds tracker — [[https:// | ||
| + | * The Wire investigation on Electoral Bonds (2019 onwards) — [[https:// | ||
| + | * The Hindu on ECI opposition to Electoral Bonds — [[https:// | ||
| + | * Scroll analysis of bond data post-disclosure — [[https:// | ||
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| + | ===== FAQ ===== | ||
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| + | ==== Can I now file an RTI to get Electoral Bond data? ==== | ||
| + | The Supreme Court' | ||
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| + | ==== Did the RTI route actually work for Electoral Bonds? ==== | ||
| + | Not directly. The RTI route was systematically blocked by the SBI and Finance Ministry. What worked was the PIL route, which used the documented RTI failures as evidence of the opacity problem. This is a case where RTI's greatest contribution was demonstrating what it could not reach. | ||
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| + | ==== Are Electoral Bonds still in operation? ==== | ||
| + | No. The Supreme Court struck down the scheme in February 2024. No new bonds can be issued. The SBI disclosed all historical bond data to the ECI in March 2024 as directed by the Court. | ||
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| + | ===== Related ===== | ||
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| + | * [[https:// | ||
| + | * [[https:// | ||
| + | * [[https:// | ||
| + | * [[https:// | ||
| + | * [[https:// | ||
| + | ===== Electoral bonds and RTI: How the Supreme Court struck down electoral bonds ===== | ||
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| + | Electoral bonds and RTI — complete case study on how the Supreme Court struck down the electoral bond scheme: | ||
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| + | - **Step 1: What were electoral bonds?** (a) electoral bonds were financial instruments — introduced by the Government of India — through the Finance Act, 2017 — as a mode of donation to political parties — by individuals and companies, (b) the bonds were issued by the State Bank of India (SBI) — in specified denominations (Rs 1,000, Rs 10,000, Rs 1 lakh, Rs 10 lakh, Rs 1 crore) — and were available for purchase — during specified periods — at SBI branches, (c) the donor purchased the bond (with KYC — the donor' | ||
| + | - **Step 2: The RTI challenge.** (a) the electoral bonds were challenged — through RTI — by activists and civil society organizations — who filed RTI applications — asking for: (i) the total bonds sold (and the amount — and the donors), (ii) the total bonds redeemed (by each political party — and the amount), (iii) the donor details (the names of the donors — and the amounts — and the parties they donated to), (b) the government and the SBI refused — to provide the information — under Section 8(1)(d) (commercial confidence) — and Section 8(1)(j) (personal information) — and the CIC ordered disclosure — in several cases — but the government and the SBI did not comply, (c) the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) — and Common Cause — filed a writ petition — in the Supreme Court — challenging the electoral bond scheme — on grounds of: (i) opacity (the anonymity violated the voter' | ||
| + | - **Step 3: The Supreme Court judgment.** (a) on February 15, 2024 — the Supreme Court (a 5-judge bench — led by the Chief Justice of India) struck down the electoral bond scheme — as unconstitutional — in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, (b) the court held: (i) the electoral bonds violated the right to information (under Article 19(1)(a) — the voter has the right to know the source of political funding — and the anonymity of the bonds — violated this right), (ii) the scheme was not proportional (the restriction on the right to information — was not proportional — to the stated objective — of encouraging clean donations — because there were less restrictive alternatives — like electoral trusts — and digital donations — with disclosure), | ||
| + | - **Step 4: The SBI disclosure.** (a) the SBI initially sought an extension (citing the complexity of the records — and the need for time — to compile the data — which the court rejected — and directed the SBI to disclose — by March 12, 2024), (b) the SBI disclosed the data (on March 12, 2024 — to the Election Commission — which published the data — on its website), (c) the data revealed: (i) the total bonds sold (Rs 16,518 crore — from April 2019 to February 2024), (ii) the total bonds redeemed (Rs 16,518 crore — by political parties), (iii) the top donors (Future Gaming, Megha Engineering, | ||
| + | - **Step 5: File RTI on electoral bonds.** File RTI with: (a) the State Bank of India (which is a [[/ | ||
| + | - **Step 6: Impact of the judgment.** (a) the judgment strengthened the right to information (by holding that political funding — is a matter of public interest — and the voter' | ||
| + | - **Step 7: Practical tips.** (a) check the ECI website (for the electoral bond data — and the donor details — and the party details — before filing RTI), (b) file RTI with the SBI (for the bond sale and redemption details — and the donor details — if not available on the ECI website), (c) file RTI with the Ministry of Finance (for the scheme details — and the post-judgment review — and the proposed alternatives), | ||
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| + | See [[https:// | ||
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| + | {{tag> | ||