Two FIRs now exist about one fight, one accident, one transaction. Is the second one legal? The answer is not a flat yes or no, and the Supreme Court laid down the way to work it out on 12 July 2001.
This page is only about multiplicity: one incident, how many FIRs. Start with the six questions.
Answer in order. Stop at the first question that gives you a verdict. If you are the one being refused an FIR, read “the second FIR” as the one you are trying to file.
Now take your verdict into this table.
| Your verdict | If you are the person named as accused | If you are the complainant being turned away |
|---|---|---|
| LAWFUL | The second FIR will not be quashed just because it is second. Defend it on its own facts. | Insist on registration. Quote the counter case rule at the station in writing. |
| PROBABLY LAWFUL | Argue sameness on the papers, not on the count of FIRs. | Give the wider facts in writing, dated, and keep the receipt. |
| ABUSIVE | A petition under Section 528 of the BNSS is the route. Papers list is below. | Your remedy is not a second FIR. Ask for further investigation in the existing one. |
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is repealed. Since 1 July 2024 the governing law is the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Act 46 of 2023. Section 531(1) of the BNSS repeals the old Code, and Section 531(2)(a) keeps any investigation already pending on that date running under the old Code.
Does that repeal kill the 2001 judgment? No. The judgment reasons from the scheme of Sections 154, 156, 162 and 173 of the old Code, and every one of those has a successor that carries the same scheme forward: information in cognizable cases is now Section 173 of the BNSS, the police power to investigate is Section 175, and further investigation after the report is Section 193(9). The doctrine moves with the sections.
In T.T. Antony versus State of Kerala, decided 12 July 2001, the Supreme Court dealt with a police firing at Kuthuparamba in Kannur district on 25 November 1994. Two FIRs were registered at the time. Nearly three years later, after a commission of inquiry reported, a third case was registered over the same firing. The Court held: “Thus there can be no second F.I.R. and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.”
That is the sentence every lawyer quotes. Two more lines from the same judgment matter just as much and are quoted far less.
On what counts as sameness, the Court said that if “the gravamen of the charges in the two FIRs, the first and the second, is in substance and truth the same”, then registering the second and investigating afresh “will be irregular and the Court can not take cognizance of the same”.
On why it matters to a citizen, the Court said the police power of investigation “does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report”. Doing so is “a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case”.
The Court quashed the third FIR, leaving the police free to seek the Magistrate's permission to make further investigation in the two original cases instead.
This is the exception that matters most often, because most real disputes have two sides and both go to the police.
The carve-out was built into T.T. Antony from the start. Setting out when quashing is warranted, the Court wrote of “a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction”. Five words in the middle of that sentence do the work.
Three years later the Supreme Court said so expressly. In Upkar Singh versus Ved Prakash, decided 10 September 2004, the appellant and the respondent had lodged separate complaints about the same incident of 20 May 1995. Only one was registered. The Court held that T.T. Antony “only held any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code”, and then drew the line that decides most cases: “This prohibition noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does not apply to counter complaint by the accused in the 1st complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident.”
Be precise about the width of that. The exception is for a counter complaint by the person accused in the first FIR, or on his behalf, giving a different version of the same incident. It is not a general licence for any rival to open a second file.
The Court also explained why. If the real wrongdoer runs to the station first with a false complaint, then on the opposite reading “the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question”, and so “deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused to books”. The Court said flatly: “This cannot be the purport of the Code.”
Upkar Singh quoted with approval an earlier decision, Kari Choudhary versus Mst. Sita Devi, for the practical form of it: “when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency.”
T.T. Antony itself accepted this exception, while applying it against the appellant.
The Solicitor General had relied on Ram Lal Narang versus State, where two FIRs covered what looked like one affair. The Supreme Court in T.T. Antony recorded that in Narang's case “the real question was whether the two conspiracies were in substance and truth the same”, and that on the facts they were not identical: “the first was a smaller conspiracy and the second was the larger conspiracy as it turned out eventually”.
So the test is not whether the second FIR mentions the same event. It is whether the criminal design alleged in the second is genuinely wider, in people, in period, or in object. A second FIR that adds two more names to the same brawl is not a larger conspiracy. One that alleges a two-year racket of which the first incident was a single episode may be.
Upkar Singh noted that Ram Lal Narang goes further still, allowing even the same complainant to file a further complaint on material gathered during investigation, but declined to rest on that wider proposition: “this larger proposition of law laid down in Ram Lal Narang's case is not necessary to be relied on by us in the present case.” Do not overstate it in a petition.
In Anju Chaudhary versus State of U.P., decided 13 December 2012, the Supreme Court set out the working method: “The Court in order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of sameness to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences.”
If the answer falls in the first category, the Court said, “the second FIR may be liable to be quashed”. If the versions are different and relate to two different incidents, “the second FIR is permissible”.
Two illustrations from the judgment decide a lot of real cases. The same group committing theft in a similar manner in different localities under different jurisdictions can attract separate FIRs, even close together in time. Riots breaking out from one event but “in different areas and between different people” can attract separate FIRs. But, the Court added, “for the same event and offences against the same people, there cannot be a second FIR”.
Notice the word may in “may be liable to be quashed”. Even a genuinely duplicate FIR is not quashed automatically. Somebody has to move the High Court and persuade it.
These are the situations where a second FIR gets registered and should not have been.
The inherent power that used to sit in Section 482 of the CrPC now sits in Section 528 of the BNSS, headed “Saving of inherent powers of High Court”. Nothing in the Sanhita limits the High Court's inherent power to make orders “necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice”. A parallel route is Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. T.T. Antony named both.
Papers to assemble before your lawyer drafts, because sameness is decided on documents:
Our separate guide on quashing a false FIR under Section 528 of the BNSS covers the general grounds. Multiplicity is a narrower and usually stronger ground, so lead with it.
Where RTI helps. You will not get the case diary. Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act, 2005 exempts “information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders”, and police PIOs cite it reflexively. Status facts are different. Ask the station or district PIO for the date on which a report under Section 193 of the BNSS went to the Magistrate in each FIR, the receipt entry for your own representations, and the file noting on any complaint you sent to the Superintendent of Police. A refusal that only recites the clause, without saying how disclosure would impede anything, is worth an appeal. Draft with the AI RTI Drafter, test the reply with the PIO Reply Checker, and escalate using the First Appeal Builder.
“A case is already registered on this incident, we cannot take yours” is right in one situation and wrong in three. It is right if you are the same complainant adding to your own earlier version. It is wrong if you are the person named in that FIR and want to give your own version, or if your facts are a different occurrence, or if they allege a wider scheme.
The ladder under the BNSS is short and each rung is written down.
If your complaint is against a public servant acting in the course of official duties, Section 175(4) adds a step. The Magistrate must first receive a report on the incident from the officer superior to that public servant, and consider the public servant's own account. Put your version on record early and in writing, so it is not the only account before him.
Sonipat, boundary wall dispute. On 14 March 2026 two neighbours, Ramesh Kadian and Jitender Malik, came to blows. Jitender reached the station first. FIR No. 214 of 2026 was registered at 8.40 pm naming Ramesh and his brother. Ramesh came next morning with his own version, that Jitender's side struck first. The duty officer refused: “case already registered on this incident.”
What the law said. This is Upkar Singh exactly. Ramesh is the person accused in the first FIR, giving a different version of the same incident. That is a counter case, not a prohibited second FIR.
What he did. He handed in a written complaint on 15 March and got no receipt. On 17 March he posted it to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) by speed post. Nothing moved for three weeks. On 9 April he applied to the Magistrate under Section 173(4) with an affidavit, and the Magistrate ordered registration and investigation under Section 175(3). FIR No. 291 of 2026 followed on 21 April, thirty-eight days after the fight.
The other half. In May, Jitender's side got a third FIR registered on the same 14 March fight, adding two cousins and the same allegations in stronger words. That is not a counter case. It is the same complainant improving his own version, which is what T.T. Antony forbids, and a candidate for Section 528.
Names and numbers are illustrative.
Facing several FIRs across districts or states on the same facts, the word you will hear is clubbing, or consolidation. No provision of the BNSS gives you a right to it. Courts do it in the exercise of inherent powers under Section 528, or writ jurisdiction under Article 226, or transfer powers, and all of that is discretionary. Anju Chaudhary's own language is permissive: a duplicate second FIR “may be liable to be quashed”, not shall.
So outcomes vary between High Courts and between benches on similar facts. Plead the sameness of the FIRs document by document, ask for quashing of the later ones as your primary relief, and treat consolidation as an alternative you are requesting, not an entitlement.
No. T.T. Antony bars a second FIR and fresh investigation on the same occurrence, but its own words exclude a counter case. Upkar Singh confirmed that a person accused in the first FIR may lodge his own version. A genuinely different occurrence, or a genuinely larger conspiracy, also survives.
Only if you are the same complainant adding to your own earlier information. If you are the one named as accused in that FIR and want to give a different version, the refusal is wrong. Give it in writing, take the free copy under Section 173(2) of the BNSS, and escalate under Section 173(4).
Section 528 of the BNSS, titled Saving of inherent powers of High Court. It preserves the High Court's power to make orders to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Article 226 and 227 remain available alongside it.
No. T.T. Antony says that where the FIR mentions attempt to murder or grievous hurt and the victim later dies, a fresh FIR would be irregular, and “alteration of the provision of law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt”.
From Anju Chaudhary, 13 December 2012. The court examines whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and same occurrence, or to two or more parts of the same transaction, or completely to two distinct occurrences. Same incident and same people points to quashing the second. Different incidents means the second is permissible.
No, and they do not need to. Section 193(9) of the BNSS lets them make further investigation after the report has gone to the Magistrate, and forward a further report on the fresh evidence. During trial the court's permission is needed and it must finish within ninety days, extendable with permission.
Yes. Anju Chaudhary gives that exact illustration. Riots breaking out from one event but in different areas and between different people can carry separate FIRs, and the first FIR about the trigger does not bar them.