RTI Grounds for Rejection 2026 — 10 Valid Section 8(1) Refusals

Section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 contains ten grounds on which a Public Information Officer (PIO) may reject a request — from national security to personal information. After the DPDP 2025 amendment to Section 8(1)(j) (notified 14 November 2025), the public-interest override moved out of clause (j) and now operates only via Section 8(2). Every rejection must cite a specific sub-clause with factual nexus under Section 7(8)(i) — a generic “exempt under Section 8” letter is itself an appealable defect, and Section 20 makes wrongful refusal personally penal up to Rs 25,000.

→ Use our PIO Reply Checker — paste the refusal text and the tool flags wrong-clause invocations and missing severability automatically.

The diagram is the legal order of analysis. A ground under §8(1) is never the first gate. A PIO must first establish that the body is a public authority and that the request is for “information” as defined; then apply §7(9) for form, not refusal; only then reach §8(1) / §9 / §24 and the §8(2) override and §10 severability.

If the body is not a public authority under §2(h), the RTI Act does not apply. A cooperative society, private company, or trust not substantially financed or controlled by the government is outside scope.

Authority. Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2013) 16 SCC 82 — substantial-financing test. See also Kerala HC RTI rulings for the HC-level application.

Section 2(f) defines “information” as material in any form that exists on record. The PIO is not obliged to answer questions, interpret law, or create fresh analysis.

This is the single biggest drafting fix. The Act's Section 5(3) even casts a positive duty on the PIO to help reframe such queries. The full method, with 20+ examples, is at Why RTI gets rejected — drafting fix-it guide.

Section 7(9) lets the PIO change the form in which information is provided — not refuse it. Where collation would “disproportionately divert resources,” the PIO may offer inspection + copies of identified pages. Outright refusal under §7(9) is impermissible.

See PIO Framework — §7(9) alternative form and Section 7 — reply deadline and form.

Plain English. For genuine national-security or strategic-harm cases — not for documents stamped “Confidential.”

Key caveat. An internal “Secret” or “Confidential” marking is not a ground. The PIO must show *specific* harm disclosure would cause. A blanket citation of §8(1)(a) without a harm-test fails on appeal.

Case law.

• S.P. Gupta v. UoI, AIR 1982 SC 149 — classified files do not enjoy automatic immunity; the harm-test applies.

PIO takeaway. Record the specific item + how it maps to sovereignty / security / strategic / scientific / economic interest or foreign relations. Blanket refusal fails.

Plain English. Applies only when a specific court / tribunal order bars publication. “Matter is sub-judice” by itself is not enough.

Common PIO error. Citing “case pending in court” as a §8(1)(b) ground. Sub-judice alone is insufficient.

Case law.

• Namit Sharma v. UoI, (2013) 1 SCC 745 — exemptions to be narrowly read.

Plain English. Used primarily where a statute requires information (a report) to be laid before the Legislature, or where the Legislature has specifically ordered non-disclosure.

A subtle point — Commission of Inquiry reports. Under Section 3(4) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, a government must lay the report before the Legislature within 6 months. If it fails to do so, the breach of privilege has already occurred — §8(1)© cannot then be used to shield the report from an RTI applicant.

Plain English. All four must be satisfied: (i) the data belongs to a third party; (ii) it is trade-secret / commercial-confidence / IP; (iii) disclosure would harm competitive position; (iv) no larger public interest overrides.

What is NOT commercial confidence. Tender bid particulars, project specifications, performance guarantees by a winning bidder to a public authority are not automatic trade secrets. Technical evaluation minutes post-award are disclosable — the evaluation is a public-authority act. See PIO Framework — tender and contract RTI and Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. WBIC (Calcutta HC, 2015).

Case law.

• M/s Carbon Resources v. Kerala SIC, Kerala HC (2015) — commercial confidence needs demonstrable competitive harm, not a label.
• Reserve Bank of India v. Jayantilal Mistry, (2016) 5 SCC 136 — RBI's own regulatory records are disclosable; §8(1)(d) can't shield them.

Plain English. A fiduciary relationship requires choice + trust + benefit of the provider — lawyer / client, doctor / patient, banker / customer, trustee / beneficiary.

What is NOT fiduciary.

• Information given to fulfil a statutory requirement (income-tax return, passport application, job application) — no choice, no fiduciary.
• Employee service records held by the employer — regulatory, not fiduciary.
• Information the regulator holds about a regulated entity — not fiduciary.

Case law.

• CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497 — evaluated answer scripts are not fiduciary; scores are disclosable.
• RBI v. Jayantilal Mistry, (2016) 5 SCC 136 — the regulator-regulated relationship is not fiduciary.
• ICAI v. Shaunak Satya, (2011) 8 SCC 781 — examiner identity and model answers are fiduciary.

Deep dive. PIO Framework — §8(1)(e) Fiduciary relationship.

Plain English. The only clause where a mere claim of “received in confidence” triggers exemption. Most information received from a foreign government is therefore unlikely to be given unless it has already been released into the public domain.

PIO takeaway. Record the foreign-government source and the confidentiality note. For post-release information, §8(1)(f) does not resurrect.

Plain English. For whistleblowers and confidential informants in law-enforcement — not for routine examiner names, interviewer names, or remarks by superior officers.

Common PIO error. Using §8(1)(g) to shield names of examiners / evaluators / selection-committee members. That is §8(1)(e) territory at best; §8(1)(g) requires a real and reasonable probability of threat to life.

Plain English. Information can be refused only if disclosure would genuinely impede one of: ongoing investigation, apprehension of the accused, or ongoing prosecution.

Time-bound. §8(1)(h) does not mean “any case pending in court.” Once the investigation report is submitted / closed, §8(1)(h) ceases to apply and fresh reasoning must be recorded for any continued exemption. S. Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal (Calcutta HC, 2018) and S. Muthukumarasamy v. Commissioner, Labour Dept (Madras HC, 2018) both enforce this.

The mere fact that release may weaken the prosecution case is not a ground — that would be protecting untruths on the record.

Plain English. This is a time-bounded exemption — not a permanent bar. Cabinet deliberations are protected during decision-making. Once the decision is taken and the matter is complete, the government must disclose the reasons and material.

Authority. R.K. Jain v. UoI, (2013) 14 SCC 794 — post-decisional disclosability of file-notings and cabinet deliberations.

Statutory reinforcement. §4(1)© — publish all relevant facts while formulating important policies. §4(1)(d) — provide reasons for administrative / quasi-judicial decisions. These duties ripen after the cabinet decision.

Plain English. Two tests for a §8(1)(j) refusal:

1. Is the information personal (attributes of an individual, not an institution)?
2. Does disclosure cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy, with no relationship to public activity?

If the information is already in the public domain, or flows from a public activity (applying for a job, ration card, passport, tender), §8(1)(j) typically fails.

Case law.

• Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. CIC, (2013) 1 SCC 212 — service records of public servants generally fall within §8(1)(j); salary / rank data is open.
• Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. UoI, (2017) 10 SCC 1 — privacy as fundamental right; proportionality governs any intrusion.
• R.K. Jain v. UoI, (2013) 14 SCC 794 — subjective evaluation (ACR) is personal but subject to §8(2) public interest.
• Thalappalam Cooperative Bank (as applied) — member-level financial data carries a privacy interest even in a public authority.

PIO takeaway. Post-2025, record the privacy analysis inside §8(1)(j), then separately record any §8(2) override analysis. The two are now textually and analytically distinct.

Plain English. If the copyright belongs to someone other than the State — a publisher, film-maker, artist — the public authority cannot hand out copies.

If the copyright belongs to the State, the information must be disclosed. Some state rules specify that for priced publications, the RTI fee equals the sale price — but no State-copyrighted material can be refused on copyright grounds.

See Section 9 — Copyright.

§11 is procedural, not a standalone ground. When requested information relates to a third party (a vendor, a complainant, another citizen), the PIO must:

1. Within 5 days of receipt, give written notice to the third party.
2. The third party has 10 days to represent.
3. The PIO then decides, within 40 days total, recording reasoning.

A §11 notice skipped is a procedural defect — the PIO order is fragile on appeal. Skipping §11 is one of the top reasons FAA orders are set aside.

Authority. C. Muniyappan v. State of Tamil Nadu (Madras HC, 2013); Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. WBIC (Calcutta HC, 2016).

Deep dive: Section 11 — Third-party information and FAA framework — privacy vs public interest balancing.

Section 24(1) exempts the intelligence and security organisations listed in the Second Schedule — for example: IB, RAW, CBI, Directorate of Enforcement, NCB, and specified state agencies.

Critical carve-outs.

• §24(1) proviso — allegations of corruption or human-rights violation are disclosable, even for Schedule-II agencies.
• §24(2) proviso — for human-rights requests, the request goes through the CIC (central) or SIC (state); response time 45 days.

See Section 24 — Intelligence and security.

Section 8(2) is the master override. Even when a §8(1) exemption applies, disclosure may be ordered if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interest.

Who applies §8(2)?

• PIO at first instance — must record the balancing reasoning when applying or rejecting the override.
• FAA on First Appeal — reviews the PIO's balancing and may substitute its own.
• SIC / CIC on Second Appeal — the final balancing forum.
• High Court on writ — reviews on legal principle.

Record-keeping requirement. “Public interest not satisfied” without analysis is an appealable defect. The officer must lay out the benefit of disclosure, the harm avoided, and why one outweighs the other.

Deep dive: FAA framework — privacy vs public interest and §19(8) — FAA's disclosure power.

Section 10 requires the PIO to sever exempt content from non-exempt content. A blanket refusal of an entire document — when only a portion is exempt — is itself a §10 violation.

Example. An inspection report contains (a) procedural sections, (b) an identified whistleblower's name. The PIO must sever (b) under §8(1)(g) and release (a) with the name redacted.

See Section 10 — Severability and Principal, GMC Thiruvananthapuram v. KIC (Kerala HC, 2019) — severability is favoured over blanket denial.

A PIO cannot refuse on any of these grounds, even if cited:

• “Confidential” / “Secret” stamp on the file. §8(1)(a) requires specific harm-test.
• “Matter is sub-judice.” §8(1)(b) requires an express court order.
• “Why” questions. This is a drafting issue, not a refusal ground. The PIO has a §5(3) duty to help reframe. See Why RTI gets rejected.
• “No reason given by the applicant.” §6(2) explicitly bars asking for reasons.
• “Voluminous request.” §7(9) allows offering inspection + selective copies, not blanket refusal.
• “Information is old.” If records exist, they must be supplied. The Act sets no age limit.
• “Information lies with another department.” §6(3) requires the PIO to transfer within 5 days.
• “Applicant's motive is malafide.” §6(2) bars inquiry into motive.
• “Larger public interest not served.” This cannot refuse disclosure — §8(2) is an override to disclose, not a freestanding exemption.

Common PIO errors: PIO RTI Reply Guide. Drafting fixes if your RTI was refused: drafting fix-it guide.

Pratibha Jaiswal, a 34-year-old PWD junior engineer in Lucknow, filed an RTI in November 2025 asking for the caste / category certificate submitted by a colleague at the time of recruitment, plus the internal complaint inquiry that her colleague had been promoted past her. The PIO refused both items under §8(1)(j) — “personal information, unwarranted invasion of privacy”.

• Day 33 (4 December 2025): Pratibha filed a First Appeal under Section 19(1) to the Chief Engineer (FAA). Her grounds, in three short paragraphs:
  1. Recruitment is a public activity — Bhagat Singh v. CIC, Delhi HC W.P.(C) 3114/2007. The caste certificate was submitted to the public authority as part of that public activity. §8(1)(j) cannot apply.
  2. Even if §8(1)(j) had applied before 14 November 2025, the internal public-interest override has been removed by §44(3) of the DPDP Act, 2023. The PIO's order conflates the old and new text and is therefore based on a wrong clause.
  3. Severability under §10 was not even attempted — the entire reply is one paragraph of refusal.
• Day 47 (18 December 2025): The FAA passed an order directing the PIO to supply the caste certificate (recruitment record) within 10 days, free of cost under Section 7(6) since the PIO's first reply was procedurally defective. The internal inquiry report was severed under §10 — administrative actions disclosed, identifiers redacted.
• Day 58 (29 December 2025): Documents supplied. Pratibha used them to file a representation to the Departmental Promotion Committee. Her stagnation cleared in the next round.

The decisive ground was §44(3) DPDP analysis — the PIO had simply photocopied a pre-DPDP reply template without noticing the law had changed. After 14 November 2025, every §8(1)(j) refusal that ports the old language is open to a “wrong-text” challenge. Use it.

→ Full FAA appeal procedure, sample letter, statutory ladder: First Appeal under RTI — Section 19(1) full guide.

Key takeaway. Every refusal must be locatable on one of §8(1) / §9 / §24. §11 alone is not a ground — if your refusal cites only §11, it is procedurally defective.

1. First Appeal under §19(1) — file within 30 days of receipt of refusal (or of expiry of the 30-day reply window). Addressed to the FAA within the same public authority. FAA decides in 30 days, extendable by 15 days with reasons — max 45 days. See First Appeal timelines and FAA appellate-review checklist.
2. Second Appeal under §19(3) — file within 90 days of the FAA's decision (or of expiry of the FAA's time). Addressed to the SIC (state records) or CIC (central records). Second Appeals may be argued in person.
3. Writ petition — under Articles 226 (HC) or 32 (SC) for pure questions of law where the Commission has made a legal error or failed to follow precedent.
4. Section 20 penalty — ask the Commission in the second appeal to impose up to Rs. 25,000 on the PIO who refused without valid ground, delayed, or gave false / misleading information. Penalty is personal to the officer.

Q1. How many grounds are there in Section 8(1)?
Exactly ten — clauses (a) through (j). Any denial citing a ground outside these ten is invalid.

Q2. Is “sub-judice” a valid ground to refuse?
No. §8(1)(b) requires an express court order forbidding publication. Mere pendency is not enough.

Q3. Can a PIO refuse by citing “Confidential” on the file?
No. An internal classification is not itself a §8(1)(a) ground. The PIO must demonstrate specific harm.

Q4. What changed in §8(1)(j) on 14 November 2025?
The internal public-interest override and the Parliament proviso were removed by §44(3) of the DPDP Act, 2023. Public-interest balancing now operates only via §8(2). See PIO Framework — §8(1)(j) after DPDP.

Q5. Can I get copies of file-notings?
Yes. Once the decision is taken and the matter is complete, §8(1)(i) does not bar file-notings. The post-decisional disclosure principle in R.K. Jain v. UoI (2013) 14 SCC 794 applies.

Q6. Can the PIO ask me why I want the information?
No — §6(2) expressly bars this, except for the purposes of contacting the applicant.

Q7. If my request is voluminous, can the PIO refuse?
No. §7(9) allows the PIO to change the form — typically by offering inspection and copies of specified pages — but not to refuse outright.

Q8. Can I get the audit / inspection report of a regulated entity?
Yes — RBI v. Jayantilal Mistry, (2016) 5 SCC 136 confirmed it, and subsequent HC rulings (Indian Bank at Madras, KSEB at Kerala) apply it.

Q9. What is Section 24 — does it cover all police / security agencies?
No. Only those listed in the Second Schedule. And even then, corruption and human-rights-violation allegations are disclosable under the proviso.

Q10. What's the maximum penalty on a PIO for wrongful refusal?
Rs. 25,000 under §20(1), imposed personally on the defaulting officer. Repeated defaults can attract departmental action under the service rules. Plead Section 20 explicitly in your Second Appeal before the CIC / SIC.

Q11. The PIO refused citing §8(1)(d) “commercial confidence” for a contract / tender. What now?
Tender-bid particulars and post-award contract terms are generally not trade secrets — they are public-authority acts. RBI v. Jayantilal Mistry, (2016) 5 SCC 136 and the PIO Tender & Contract framework (deep dive) treat these as disclosable. Frame your appeal ground as: (a) the data is not a trade secret of a third party; (b) §8(1)(d) requires demonstrable competitive harm; © §8(2) public interest favours disclosure; (d) §10 severance can protect any genuinely confidential cost build-up.

Q12. Can the PIO ask me to specify §8 sub-clause if I'm appealing a “deemed refusal” (no reply at all)?
No — §7(2) treats silence as a refusal without any clause cited. The FAA proceeds de novo on the grounds. You do not have to identify which sub-clause was implicitly invoked; the burden is on the PIO under §19(5) to justify any continued refusal.

The 10 grounds above are abstract until you see them in a real letter. These enriched sample-letter pages each include a Section 8 risks pre-empted block already drafted into the RTI body, along with the First Appeal grounds if the PIO still refuses:

• Passport — sample RTI + Bhagat Singh / Maneka Gandhi citations
• PF withdrawal — sample RTI + EPF Scheme §72(7) hooks
• Scholarship — sample RTI + parallel-PIO strategy
• FIR / charge-sheet — Lalita Kumari (2014) + §156(3) CrPC route
• Ration card — NFSA 2013 + state PDS Control Order
• MGNREGA wages — §3(3) compensation + parallel BDO + DPC RTIs
• MPLAD — Bhim Singh (2010) + MPLADS Guidelines 2023
• Land mutation — state-wise statutory windows

• The RTI Act, 2005 (as amended)
• §7 — Reply deadline and form
• §8 — Exemption from disclosure
• §9 — Copyright
• §10 — Severability
• §11 — Third-party information
• §19 — Appeals
• §20 — Penalties
• §24 — Intelligence and security

• PIO / FAA knowledge base
• PIO RTI Reply Guide
• PIO Framework — §8(1)(j) after DPDP
• PIO Framework — §8(1)(e) Fiduciary
• PIO Framework — §7(9) alternative form
• PIO Framework — deemed refusal §7(2)
• FAA appellate-review checklist
• First Appeal timelines
• FAA — privacy vs public interest
• FAA — §19(8) disclosure powers

• Bombay HC RTI rulings
• Madras HC RTI rulings
• Kerala HC RTI rulings
• Karnataka HC RTI rulings
• Calcutta HC RTI rulings

• How to file RTI online — 2026 guide
• Why RTI gets rejected — drafting fix-it guide
• RTI FAQ — 25 most-asked questions
• All explanations

• Right to Information Act, 2005 (as amended 2019, 2023)
• Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 — §44(3) amending RTI §8(1)(j) (effective 14 November 2025)
• Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 — §3(4)
• S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149
• CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497
• ICAI v. Shaunak Satya, (2011) 8 SCC 781
• Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. CIC, (2013) 1 SCC 212
• Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745
• R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (2013) 14 SCC 794
• Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2013) 16 SCC 82
• RBI v. Jayantilal N. Mistry, (2016) 5 SCC 136
• Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1

Last reviewed: 4 May 2026 — RTI Wiki editorial team. All citations verified against the RTI Act, 2005 (as amended), the DPDP Act 2023, and CIC / SC / HC orders as on 4 May 2026.