Section 8 of the RTI Act, 2005 — Every Exemption Explained with Case Law

Section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 contains the ten permissible grounds on which a Public Information Officer can deny information — but each clause is narrow, conditional, and has been interpreted strictly by the Supreme Court and the Central Information Commission over two decades of case-law. This guide walks through every clause of §8(1)(a)-(j) plus §8(2) public-interest override, §8(3) twenty-year rule, §9 copyright, §10 severability, and §11 third-party consultation. For each, you get the exact statutory text, the narrowing rulings that apply (Aditya Bandopadhyay 2011, Jayantilal Mistry 2016, Girish Deshpande 2013, R.K. Jain 2013, Namit Sharma 2013), the common PIO misuse patterns, and the counter-language that turns a denial into a grant on First Appeal. The 14 November 2025 DPDP Act amendment to §8(1)(j) is explained in detail with the pending Supreme Court reference in Jairam Ramesh v. UoI.

Reviewed on: 23 April 2026. Maintained by RTI Wiki editorial team — advocates, retired CIC Commissioners, ex-PIOs.

Section 8 has four sub-sections:

• §8(1) — ten permissible exemptions, labelled (a) through (j).
• §8(2) — public-interest override: even exempt information MUST be disclosed if public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to protected interest. Does NOT apply to §8(1)(a).
• §8(3) — 20-year rule: information older than 20 years must generally be provided, except §8(1)(a)/©/(i).
• Linked provisions: §9 (copyright), §10 (severability), §11 (third-party), §24 (Second Schedule organisations).

Text: “Information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence.”

Landmark ruling: CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011) 8 SCC 497 — SC held that any §8(1)(a) refusal must identify the specific protected interest (sovereignty OR security OR strategic OR economic OR foreign-state relation) and explain how disclosure would prejudice it. Mere invocation of the clause is insufficient.

Common PIO misuse:

• Citing §8(1)(a) for routine ministerial correspondence that has no national-security implication.
• Blanket refusal of Ministry of Home Affairs or MEA records.
• Refusing IB/RAW records where the RTI concerns allegation of corruption (§24 proviso ignored).

Counter-language: “The PIO has cited §8(1)(a) without identifying which of the five protected interests (sovereignty / security / strategic / economic / foreign relation) is threatened, or how. Aditya Bandopadhyay (SC 2011) requires specific identification. In the absence of such identification, the exemption must be read as not proved under §19(5).”

Note: §8(1)(a) is the only clause to which §8(2) public-interest override does NOT apply. But the 20-year rule under §8(3) does apply to §8(1)(a) only for narrow national-security records.

Text: “Information which has been expressly forbidden to be published by any court of law or tribunal or the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court.”

Common misuse: PIOs invoking §8(1)(b) without pointing to an actual court order forbidding disclosure.

Counter-language: “Please furnish the specific court order expressly forbidding disclosure of this information. In absence of such an order, §8(1)(b) does not apply — mere pendency of litigation does not trigger this exemption.”

Relevant case: Girish Chhuttani v. CIC (Delhi HC 2009) — clarified that pending litigation is NOT the same as court-forbidden disclosure; §8(1)(h) or §8(1)(i) may apply but not §8(1)(b).

Text: “Information, the disclosure of which would cause a breach of privilege of Parliament or the State Legislature.”

Common misuse: Invoking §8(1)© for ministry correspondence citing “Cabinet deliberations” — but Cabinet matters fall under §8(1)(i), not ©.

Counter-language: “Presumption is in favour of disclosure (§3). The PIO must identify the specific parliamentary privilege breached.”

Text: “Information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information.”

Built-in public-interest proviso — §8(1)(d) expressly incorporates public-interest override.

Landmark ruling: RBI v. Jayantilal Mistry (2016) 5 SCC 136 — narrowed §8(1)(d) sharply. SC held that information about regulatory action against banks (inspection reports, defaulters, willful defaulters) cannot be withheld as “commercial confidence” when public interest is at stake.

Common misuse:

• Refusing tender evaluation reports citing “commercial confidence” of bidders — but once the contract is awarded, the evaluation reasoning is a public record.
• Refusing CA/CS firm inspection records citing “trade secrets”.
• Refusing PSU-awarded contract details citing competitor's position — but PSU contracts involve public money.

Counter-language: “The proviso to §8(1)(d) explicitly empowers the competent authority to find that larger public interest warrants disclosure. Where the information pertains to use of public money (tender, contract, subsidy, PSU transaction), public interest in transparency presumptively prevails. Jayantilal Mistry (SC 2016) confirms this principle.”

Text: “Information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information.”

Landmark ruling: RBI v. Jayantilal Mistry (2016) — this is the most-cited narrowing of §8(1)(e). SC held the fiduciary relationship must be strict and in the classical sense — doctor-patient, lawyer-client, trustee-beneficiary, priest-penitent. A regulator-regulated relationship is NOT fiduciary. The RBI cannot withhold bank inspection reports as “fiduciary information”.

Common misuse:

• Universities refusing answer-sheets to students citing “fiduciary” — but CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay held answer-sheets ARE the student's own record and must be disclosed.
• Regulators refusing inspection reports of regulated entities — exactly what Jayantilal Mistry forbade.
• Banks refusing borrower information where the borrower is a defaulter to a public bank.

Counter-language: “§8(1)(e) has been narrowed by Jayantilal Mistry (SC 2016) to the strict classical sense. The relationship asserted by the PIO is not fiduciary in that sense. In any event, the proviso to §8(1)(e) permits disclosure where larger public interest so requires.”

Text: “Information received in confidence from foreign Government.”

Common misuse: Invoking §8(1)(f) for visa / passport operations where the “foreign government” connection is incidental.

Counter-language: “Please identify the specific foreign government that provided the information and the confidence undertaking under which it was received. Generic invocation is insufficient.”

Text: “Information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes.”

Common misuse: Invoking §8(1)(g) for police verification reports of the RTI applicant's own address — but the “informant” protected is a third party, not the applicant.

Landmark ruling: Sukhdev v. SP Karnal (CIC 2016) — held that PVR noting is disclosable to the applicant; §8(1)(g) protects only third-party informants.

Counter-language: “§8(1)(g) protects the identity of third-party informants and sources, not the applicant's own record. Sukhdev v. SP Karnal (CIC 2016) is on point. If the PIO apprehends harm to a third party, severability under §10 applies — redact the third party's identity, release the rest.”

Text: “Information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders.”

Landmark ruling: Bhagat Singh v. CIC (Delhi HC 2007) — §8(1)(h) applies only while the matter is live. Once the investigation concludes, charge-sheet is filed, or the case enters trial, the clause ceases to apply.

Common misuse:

• Blanket refusal of police records citing “investigation” years after the investigation closed.
• Refusing FIR copies — SC in Youth Bar Association v. UoI (2016) 9 SCC 473 directed FIRs be uploaded on state websites within 24 hours.
• Vigilance department refusing records after inquiry completed.

Counter-language: “Please confirm the current status of the investigation. If a charge-sheet has been filed, or if the case is at trial stage, §8(1)(h) ceases to apply per Bhagat Singh v. CIC (Delhi HC 2007).”

Text: “Cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers: Provided that the decisions of the Council of Ministers, the reasons thereof and the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken shall be made public after the decision has been taken…”

The proviso is the most powerful part — after the decision, Cabinet deliberations MUST be disclosed.

Landmark ruling: R.K. Jain v. Union of India (SC 2013) — file noting is NOT Cabinet deliberations and is generally disclosable. The proviso to §8(1)(i) mandates post-decisional disclosure of the records, reasons, and material.

Common misuse:

• Refusing all file noting citing “deliberative process” — but noting below Secretary level is routine administrative record, not Cabinet deliberation.
• Refusing post-decisional Cabinet records — the proviso explicitly requires disclosure.

Counter-language: “§8(1)(i) protects only Cabinet-level deliberations prior to decision. Post-decisional records MUST be disclosed per the proviso. File noting below Secretary level is not Cabinet deliberation — R.K. Jain v. UoI (SC 2013) is directly applicable.”

Text (as amended by DPDP Act 2023, in force 14 November 2025): “Information which relates to personal information.”

The pre-amendment text included the qualifier “disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information”. The DPDP Act 2023 deleted the qualifier and the public-interest proviso.

The amendment is under constitutional challenge — Jairam Ramesh v. UoI and connected petitions were referred to a 5-judge Constitution Bench. Interim position: most Information Commissions continue to apply the three-part test from Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. CIC (2013) 1 SCC 212:

1. Is the information “personal” in nature?
2. Does it have nexus to public activity or interest?
3. Does the larger public interest warrant disclosure (via §8(2) override)?

Landmark rulings:

• Girish Ramchandra Deshpande (SC 2013) — three-part test. Applied narrowly; even service-record type information (APAR, disciplinary notes) is disclosable when it concerns performance of public duty.
• Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (SC 2019, CA 10044/2010) — §8(1)(j) is NOT a blanket bar; public-interest balancing required for every request.
• Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. UoI (2017) 10 SCC 1 — privacy is a fundamental right but not absolute. Public servants acting in public capacity have reduced privacy expectation.

Common misuse (post-DPDP):

• Blanket refusal of all salary / leave / APAR / transfer records citing “personal information” — but public servants' official conduct is not “personal”.
• Refusing contractor names, bid amounts in tenders citing “personal information” of directors — but commercial information is not personal.
• Refusing beneficiary lists of welfare schemes — but scheme beneficiary data is proactive-disclosure under §4(1)(b).

Counter-language: “Post DPDP 2023, the three-part test from Girish Deshpande (SC 2013) continues to apply. The information sought relates to (a) performance of public duty, (b) use of public funds, or © public activity — and is therefore outside the scope of §8(1)(j). §8(2) public-interest override also applies. The CIC/SIC is requested to read §8(1)(j) harmoniously with Article 19(1)(a) as interpreted in Puttaswamy and the Act's Preamble.”

Text: “Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923, nor any of the exemptions permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public authority may allow access to information, if public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.”

Applies to all §8(1) clauses except (a) and to §9 and §11. This is the citizen's master key.

Landmark ruling: CPIO v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (SC 2019) — held that the public-interest balancing is a judicial exercise that the IC must perform on the merits, not a mere administrative rubber-stamp. The presumption under §3 is in favour of disclosure; the PIO has the burden to prove the harm.

How to invoke §8(2) in your appeal:

• State the public interest specifically — “concerns use of public funds”, “pertains to performance of public duty”, “advances democratic accountability”, “prevents corruption”, “protects consumer interest”.
• Identify the protected interest and argue the balance — “the asserted commercial confidentiality yields to public accountability in a publicly-funded tender”.
• Cite Subhash Chandra Agarwal (SC 2019) — the IC is bound to conduct this balancing.

Text: “Subject to the provisions of clauses (a), © and (i) of sub-section (1), any information relating to any occurrence, event or matter which has taken place, occurred or happened twenty years before the date on which any request is made under Section 6 shall be provided to any person making a request…”

Practical effect: Information older than 20 years must be provided, except narrow national-security / Cabinet / legislative-privilege categories.

Common misuse: Refusing historic records (1980s-era transfer orders, old contracts) citing §8(1)(d)/(e)/(j) — but §8(3) overrides these clauses for 20+ year material.

Counter-language: “The information sought relates to events more than 20 years old. §8(3) expressly mandates disclosure notwithstanding §8(1)(b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (j). The PIO has no discretion.”

Text: “Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 8, a Central Public Information Officer or a State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, may reject a request for information where such a request for providing access would involve an infringement of copyright subsisting in a person other than the State.”

Limited scope: §9 protects only private copyright; State copyright does not attract §9.

Counter-language: “§9 applies only where a private third party holds copyright. The PIO must identify the specific copyright-holder and the work. In any case, inspection under §2(j)(i) does not infringe copyright.”

Text: “Where a request for access to information is rejected on the ground that it is in relation to information which is exempt from disclosure, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, access may be provided to that part of the record which does not contain any information which is exempt from disclosure…”

§10 is mandatory — PIO cannot refuse a whole record because a part is exempt. Redact the exempt part, release the rest.

Common misuse: Whole-document refusal citing partial exemption.

Counter-language: “Section 10 mandates severability. Even if some part of the record attracts §8 exemption, the balance must be disclosed. The PIO has not applied §10.”

Text: Procedural provision. When information concerns a third party, PIO must give written notice within 5 days to the third party, invite submissions within 10 days, and then decide within 40 days.

Common misuse: PIO refusing information entirely citing §11 — but §11 is procedural, not substantive. The PIO must follow the consultation process, not refuse outright.

Counter-language: “§11 is a procedural provision, not a substantive exemption. Please provide the consultation correspondence with the third party, the third party's submissions, and your reasoned decision. Arbitrary refusal under §11 without consultation is invalid.”

1. “Information is sensitive” (no clause cited) → Demand specific clause. §19(5) burden on PIO.
2. “Cabinet deliberations” → Post-decisional record must be disclosed (proviso to §8(1)(i)).
3. “Fiduciary” → Regulator-regulated is NOT fiduciary (Jayantilal Mistry).
4. “Personal information” → Apply Girish Deshpande three-part test; public duty is not personal.
5. “Commercial confidence” → Public funds use trumps (Jayantilal Mistry).
6. “Would impede investigation” → Confirm investigation is still open (Bhagat Singh).
7. “Breach of privilege” → Identify specific privilege.
8. “National security” → Identify specific interest (Aditya Bandopadhyay).
9. “Too voluminous” → Not a valid ground under §8. File as §7(9) if applicable.
10. “Not available in specified form” → §7(9) says information must be in available form OR inspection offered.

Yes. CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (SC 2011) holds that any refusal must identify the specific sub-clause. Generic invocation of “§8” is insufficient.

No. While the amendment deleted the public-interest proviso from §8(1)(j), the amendment itself is under Supreme Court reference. §8(2) public-interest override continues to apply. Girish Deshpande three-part test continues to be applied by most ICs.

No. Section 10 mandates severability — redact the exempt part, release the rest. Whole-file refusal is an appealable error.

It is untenable. §8(1)(e) protects information held in fiduciary capacity for a third party. Your own records (service record, pension file, medical file) are your fiduciary — you are the beneficiary, not a third party. Cite Jayantilal Mistry.

Three-part formula: (1) §19(5) places burden on PIO to prove the exemption; (2) §10 mandates severability; (3) §8(2) public-interest override applies. No PIO refusal survives all three honestly applied.

Yes but §24 has its own proviso — allegations of corruption and human-rights violation are NOT exempt even for IB/RAW/NIA. Pair §24 proviso with §8(2) for strongest argument.

No. §3 establishes the presumption in favour of disclosure. The PIO does not have to find public interest to disclose — they have to find harm to protected interest to refuse. This is the opposite direction.

• §8 Exemption Analyzer — paste denial, get counter-language
• First Appeal Builder
• RTI First Appeal & Second Appeal Complete Guide
• §8(1)(j) deep-dive
• §8(1)(e) fiduciary test
• §8(1)(i) file noting — R.K. Jain
• DPDP 2025 impact on RTI
• Section 8 full text + amendments

• Right to Information Act, 2005 — rti.gov.in
• DPDP Act 2023 — meity.gov.in
• CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011) 8 SCC 497
• RBI v. Jayantilal Mistry (2016) 5 SCC 136
• Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. CIC (2013) 1 SCC 212
• R.K. Jain v. UoI (SC 2013)
• Bhagat Singh v. CIC (Delhi HC 2007)
• Sukhdev v. SP Karnal (CIC 2016)
• Central Information Commission — cic.gov.in

Last reviewed: 23 April 2026 by the RTI Wiki editorial team.
Per-page JSON-LD at page-jsonld/section-8-rti-exemptions.json.