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Did you know? The 14 November 2025 amendment to Section 8(1)(j) quietly removed the proviso that said information which cannot be denied to Parliament cannot be denied to a citizen. It is the most significant structural change to the RTI Act since 2005.
A practitioner note on what changed on 14 November 2025, how the amended clause must be read, and what Public Information Officers, First Appellate Authorities, and applicants should do differently.
On 14 November 2025, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology notified the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025. The notification brought Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 into force. By the operation of that sub-section, clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 stood substituted.
The effect is immediate. Every RTI application pending on or filed after 14 November 2025 is to be decided under the substituted clause.
Before the substitution, Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act read, in substance, that there shall be no obligation to give a citizen information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy, unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority was satisfied that the larger public interest justified the disclosure. The clause was followed by a proviso that information which could not be denied to Parliament or a State Legislature could not be denied to any person.
After the substitution effected by Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act, clause (j) reads that there shall be no obligation to give a citizen information which relates to personal information.
The difference is structural. Three elements of the earlier clause are no longer part of the text.
The accompanying proviso regarding information that could not be denied to Parliament has also been removed.
Clause (j) is now to be read with the DPDP Act's definition of “person”. Under Section 2(s) of the DPDP Act, “person” includes an individual, a Hindu undivided family, a company, a firm, an association of persons or a body of individuals whether incorporated or not, the State, and every artificial juristic person not falling within any of the preceding categories.
The definition is wider than the ordinary meaning. Public Information Officers should note two consequences.
First, information relating to a corporate entity, a firm, or an association of persons may fall within the scope of clause (j) if the information is “personal information” with reference to that entity. The position is not identical to the earlier jurisprudence under the unamended clause, which the Supreme Court had developed primarily with reference to natural persons.
Second, information relating to the State as a juristic person is now within the scope of the definition. The implications of this position will be tested in litigation.
The Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21. The Court also held that any restriction on a fundamental right must satisfy the proportionality test.
The substituted clause (j) does not displace this constitutional baseline. A Public Information Officer applying clause (j) must therefore read it alongside the proportionality standard and in a manner consistent with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, under which the right to information is derived.
The practical reading is this.
Section 8(2) is therefore the central provision through which the public interest reasoning continues to operate. Officers who previously relied on the larger-public-interest override within clause (j) must now route the same reasoning through Section 8(2).
Public Information Officers should consider the following sequence when dealing with an application that seeks information relating to an individual.
A denial without reasons is not a denial in law. The requirement of a speaking order is unaffected by the amendment.
First Appellate Authorities should note that a routine reliance on the substituted clause (j), without reasoning, is not sustainable in appeal. The authority must examine whether:
Where any of these elements is absent, the appellate order should either direct disclosure or remand the matter for a fresh order by the Public Information Officer.
Applicants seeking information that relates to an individual, an entity, or the State should frame requests with the following elements.
Several questions are expected to be decided in coming months.
The position of Information Commissions on the application of the substituted clause will develop through orders passed in the next cycle of second appeals.
Last reviewed on: 19 April 2026 — RTI Wiki editorial team.
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Last reviewed on: 20 April 2026
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